), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd Edition). Kvanvig, J. A. and Pritchard, D. Knowledge-How and Epistemic Luck. Nos (2013). He suggests that manipulating the system allows the understander to see the way in which the manipulation influences (or fails to influence) other parts of the system (2011: 11). Hetherington, S. There Can be Lucky Knowledge in M. Steup, J. Turri and E. Sosa (eds. Boston: Routledge, 2013. True enough. Philosophical issues, 14(1) (2004): 113-131. According to his positive proposal, objectual understanding is the goal and what typically sates the appetite associated with curiosity. On the one hand, there is the increasing support for virtue epistemology that began in the 1980s, and on the other there is growing dissatisfaction with the ever-complicated attempt to generate an account of knowledge that is appropriately immune to Gettier-style counterexamples (see, for example, DePaul 2009). (For example, propositions, systems, bodies of information, the relationships thereof, and so on?). This is a change from the past. If the latterthat is, if we are to understand grasping literally, then, also unfortunately, we are rarely given concrete details of its nature. Or, should we adopt a more relaxed view of what would be required to satisfy this conditionnamely, a view that focuses on the way the agent connects information. Zagzebski (2001), whose view maintains that at least not all cases of understanding require true beliefs, gestures to something like this view. Pritchard, D. Epistemic Luck. However, Elgin takes this line further and insists thatwith some qualificationsfalse central beliefs, and not merely false peripheral beliefs, are compatible with understanding a subject matter to some degree. An epistemological shift: from evidence-based medicine to epistemological responsibility J Eval Clin Pract. Grimm anticipates this point and expresses a willingness to embrace a looser conception of dependence than causal dependence, one that includes (following Kim 1994) species of dependence such as mereological dependences (that is, dependence of a whole on its parts), evaluative dependences (that is, dependence of evaluative on non-evaluative), and so on. This view, embraced by DePaul and Grimm (2009), implies that to the extent that understanding and knowledge come apart, it is not with respect to a difference in susceptibility to being undermined by epistemic luck. For example, in Whitcomb (2011) we find the suggestion that theoretical wisdom is a form of particularly deep understanding. He leaves grasping at the level of metaphor or uses it them literally but never develops it. Zagzebski notes that this easily leads to a vicious circle because neglect leads to fragmentation of meaning, which seems to justify further neglect and further fragmentation until eventually a concept can disappear entirely.. It also allows attributions of understanding in the presence of peripheral false beliefs, without going so far as to grant that understanding is present in cases of internally consistent delusionsas such delusions will feature at least some false central beliefs. Kelp, C. Understanding Phenomena. Synthese (2015). For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. 115, No. The medical epistemology we propose conforms to the epistemological responsibility of doctors, which involves a specific professional attitude and epistemological skills. A central component of Kvanvigs argument is negative; he regards knowledge as ill-suited to play the role of satisfying curiosity, and in particular, by rejecting three arguments from Whitcomb to this effect. Your paper should be 3-4 pages in length, not counting the Title page and Reference page. Olsson, E. Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification in E. Zalta (ed. Suppose further that the agent could have easily ended up with a made-up and incorrect explanation because (unbeknownst to the agent) everyone in the vicinity of the genuine fire officer who is consulted is dressed up as fire officers and would have given the wrong story (whilst failing to disclose that they were merely in costume). Riaz, A. This aside, can we consider extending Grimms conception of understanding as non-propositional knowledge of causes to the domain of objectual understanding? One issue worth bringing into sharper focus is whether knowing a good and correct explanation is really the ideal form of understanding-why. See Elgin (2004) for some further discussion of the role of acceptance and belief in her account. Relation question: What is the grasping relationship? as in testimony cases in friendly environments, where knowledge acquisition demands very little on the part of the agent), he argues that cognitive achievement is not essentially wedded to knowledge (as robust virtue epistemologists would hold). To the extent that these worries with transparency are apt, a potential obstacle emerges for the prospects of accounting for the value of understanding in terms of its transparency. Looks at the increasing dissatisfaction with ever-more complicated attempts to generate a theory of knowledge immune to counterexamples. Displacements of power in the realm of concepts accompany these new orientations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. The root of the recent resurgence of interest in understanding in epistemology. If Kelps thought experiment works, manipulation of representations cannot be a necessary condition of understanding after all. He considers that grasping might be a modal sense or ability that allows the understander to, over and above registering how things are. But is understanding factive? In so doing, he notes that the reader may be inclined to add further internalist requirements to his reliability requirement, of the sort put forward by Kvanvig (2003). We can acknowledge this simply by regarding Bs understanding as, even if only marginally, relatively impoverished, rather than by claiming, implausibly, that no understanding persists in such cases. Take first the object question. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Kvanvig stipulates that there are no falsehoods in the relevant class of beliefs that this individual has acquired from the book, and also that she can correctly answer all relevant questions whilst confidently believing that she is expressing the truth. epistemological shift pros and cons - dogalureticipazari.com Longworth, G. Linguistic Understanding and Knowledge. Nous 42 (2008): 50-79. To defend the claim that possessing the kinds of abilities Hills draws attention to is not a matter of simply having extra items of knowledgeshe notes that one could have the extra items of knowledge and still lack the good judgment that allows you to form new, related true beliefs. However, Grimm is quick to point out that defending one of these two similar views does not depend on the correctness of the other. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. Essentially, this view traditionally holds that understanding why X is the case is equivalent to knowing why X is the case (which is in turn supposed to be equivalent to knowing that X is the case because of Y). A. and Gordon, E. C. Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support. Philosophia 39(4) (2011): 615-635. Dordrecht: Springer, 2014. Finally, Section 6 proposes various potential avenues for future research, with an eye towards anticipating how considerations relating to understanding might shed light on a range of live debates elsewhere in epistemology and in philosophy more generally. Toon (2015) has recently suggested, with reference to the hypothesis of extended cognition, that understanding can be located partly outside the head. This type of understanding is ascribed in sentences that take the form I understand why X (for example, I understand why the house burnt down). Goldman, A. It focuses on means of human knowledge acquisition and how to differentiate the truth knowledge claims from the false one. Epistemology is a way of framing knowledge, it defines how it can be produced and augmented. Thirdly, and perhaps most interestingly, objectual understanding is attributed in sentences that take the form I understand X where X is or can be treated as a body of information or subject matter. Stephen P. Stitch: The Fragmentation of Reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51(1) (1991): 189-193. Questions about when and what type of understanding is required for permissible assertion connect with issues related to expertise. Wilkenfeld, D. Understanding as Representation Manipulability. Synthese 190 (2013): 997-1016. In other words, each denies all of the others respective beliefs about the subject, and yet the weak view in principle permits that they might nonetheless understand the subject equally well. For example, in Whitcomb (2010: 8), we find the observation that understanding is widely taken to be a higher epistemic good: a state that is like knowledge and true belief, but even better, epistemically speaking. Meanwhile, Pritchard (2009: 11) notes as we might be tempted to put the point, we would surely rather understand than merely know. A helpful clarification here comes from Grimm (2012: 105), who in surveying the literature on the value of understanding points out that the suggestion seems to be that understanding (of a complex of some kind) is better than the corresponding item of propositional knowledge. Some (for example, Gordon 2012) suggest that attributions of propositional understanding typically involve attributes of propositional knowledge or a more comprehensive type of understandingunderstanding-why, or objectual understanding (these types are examined more closely below). Claims that understanding is entirely compatible with both intervening and environmental forms of veritic luck. ), The Nature and Limits of Human Understanding. Many of these questions have gone largely unexplored in the literature. But it is not strictly true. But in this version of the case, suppose that, although the book is entirely authoritative, genuine and reliable, it is the only trustworthy book on the Comanche on the shelvesevery book on the shelves nearby, which she easily could have grabbed rather than the genuine authoritative book, was filled with rumors and ungrounded suppositions. By contrast, the paradigmatic case of environmental epistemic luck is the famous barn faade case (for example, Ginet 1975; Goldman 1979), a case where what an agent looks at is a genuine barn which unbeknownst to the individual is surrounded by faades which are indistinguishable to the agent from the genuine barn. For if the view is correct, then an explanation for why ones understanding why the painting is beautiful is richer, when it is, will simply be in terms of ones possession of a correct answer to the question of why it is beautiful. And, thirdly, two questions about what is involved in grasping can easily be run together, but should be kept separate. Alston, W. Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. If the former, then this is unfortunate given the theoretical work the term is supposed to be doing in characterizing understanding. To this end, the first section offers an overview of the different types of understanding discussed in the literature, though their features are gradually explored in more depth throughout later sections. Objectual understanding is equivalent to what Pritchard has at some points termed holistic understanding (2009: 12). In short, then, Kvanvig wants to insist that the true beliefs that one attains in acquiring ones understanding can all be Gettiered, even though the Gettier-style luck which prevents these beliefs from qualifying as knowledge does not undermine the understanding this individual acquires. Morris (2012), like Rohwer, also defends lucky understandingin particular, understanding-why, or what he calls explanatory understanding). In order to make this point clear, Pritchard suggests that we first consider two versions of a case analogous with Kvanvigs. This in part for three principal reasons. Epistemology is a branch in philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge. al 2014), have for understanding? That said, the question of whether, and if so to what extent, understanding is compatible with epistemic luck, lacks any contemporary consensus, though this is an aspect of understanding that is receiving increased attention. So the kind of knowledge that it provides is metaknowledgeknowledge about knowledge. Moderate factivity implies that we should withhold attributions of understanding when an agent has a single false central belief, even in cases where the would-be understanding is of a large subject matter where all peripheral beliefs in this large subject matter are true. But when the object of understanding why is essentially evaluativefor example, understanding why the statue is beautifulit seems that the quality of ones understanding could vary dramatically even when we hold fixed that one possesses a correct and complete explanation of how the statue came to be (that is, both a physical and social description of these causes). De Regt, H. and Dieks, D. A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding. Synthese 144 (2005): 137-170. Kvanvig 2003; Zagzebski 2001; Riggs 2003; Pritchard 2010), Grimms view is rooted in a view that comes from the philosophy of science and traces originally to Aristotle. However, it is less clear at least initially that retreating from causal dependence to more general dependence will be of use in the kinds of objectual understanding cases noted above. Pritchards verdict is that we should deny understanding in the intervening case and attribute it in the environmental case. Consider how some people think they grasp the ways in which their zodiac sign has an influence on their life path, yet their sense of understanding is at odds with the facts of the matter. To complicate matters further, some of the philosophers who appear to endorse one approach over the other can elsewhere be seen considering a more mixed view (for example, Khalifa 2013b). DePaul, M. and Grimm, S. Review Essay: Kvanvigs The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 498-514. ), Epistemic Value. ), The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. In other words, S knows that p only if p is true. Consider the view that the kinds of epistemic luck that suffice to undermine knowledge do not also undermine understanding. What is it to have this ability to modify some mental representation? In a given context, then, one understands some subject matter P only if one approximates fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected knowledge of P closely enough that one is sufficiently likely to successfully perform any task relating to P that is determined by the context, assuming that one has the skills needed to do so and to exercise them in suitably favorable conditions.